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Section I – An Introduction
The clergy privilege, or penitent privilege, protects communications between clergymen
and the penitent. It is a privilege that is deeply rooted in the history of United States and has
developed alongside other evidentiary privileges. However, the penitent privilege is not as cut and
dry as the other categories of privilege communication. It is a staple of religious free exercise in
this country.1 The free exercise of religion is a protected right, guaranteed in the First Amendment
of the United States Constitution. 2 Challenges to the privilege, and by extension free exercise, must
contend with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) which was enacted to ensure
religious freedoms and a strict scrutiny standard of review when such claims are raised. 3
These religious guarantees are cast in a different light, however, when considering the
Federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA). This Federal statute requires
individuals to report known or suspected instances of child abuse or neglect. 4 Under CAPTA, each
state, in its own individual action plans, must include provisions of state law “for mandatory
reporting by individuals required to report such instances.”5
With these various factors in mind, the primary issue is whether RFRA requires CAPTA
to retain the privilege for religious communications from the mandatory reporting. A secondary
issue is whether the privilege is a permissible accommodation, with or without RFRA, or whether
that accommodation violates the Establishment Clause which expressly prohibits the endorsement
or undue favoritism of religion. 6

1

See generally People v. Phillips, 1 Western L. J. 109 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813).
U.S. CONST. Amend. I, § 1.
3
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
4
42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(i)
5
Id.
6
U.S. CONST. Amend. I, § 1.
2
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It can be argued that it is imperative that the penitent privilege coexist with the CAPTA.
The protection of the penitent privilege is vital to the free exercise of religion in this country. The
penitent privilege must be evaluated through the lens of RFRA, as RFRA reinstates strict scrutiny
and a compelling interest test. The privilege promotes the search for spiritual guidance and
communication with others in a private setting. Despite any government interest that would wish
to repeal or diminish the privilege, maintaining the privilege is arguably the least restrictive
alternative in furthering the government’s interest.
The penitent privilege does not violate the Establishment Clause either. The privilege was
not specifically created to promote participation in religion. The penitent privilege is just one of
many recognized privileges and is not without its limits. It can be argued that the penitent privilege
favors some religions over others because not all religious practice the rite of confession. However,
the wording of the penitent privilege is neutral and permits the religions to benefit from the
protection if they choose to utilize the religious ceremony of confession.
The repeal or abrogation of the penitent privilege would cause greater issues. The repeal
of the penitent privilege would inhibit the free exercise of religion, and any facially neutral attempt
to curtail privileges may raise concerns of unconstitutional legislative targeting of religions like in
in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah.7 The penitent privilege is deeply rooted in
this country’s jurisprudence and tradition.8 The penitent privilege should not be repealed. There
are alternate means of discovering evidence of child maltreatment that are not protected by the
penitent privilege.
Section II – The Penitent Privilege and CAPTA

7
8

Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
See generally People v. Phillips, 1 Western L. J. 109 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813).
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The Clergy Privilege is a long-standing legal principle, dating back to the early nineteenth
century.9 All states have recognized some form of the priest-penitent privilege.10 People v. Phillips
is perhaps one of the earliest cases to recognize the privilege. 11 In Phillips, the state sought to
compel the priest’s testimony, but the priest refused to testify after a penitent parishioner confessed
to him about an alleged theft. 12 The New York Court of General Sessions noted the importance of
protecting religious communications during the Roman Catholic sacrament of confession. 13 The
Court protected the communications between a priest and a member of the parish in the sacrament
of confession, thus promoting free exercise of religion and christening the clergy privilege. 14 This
privilege, like the attorney-client privilege and the physician-patient privilege, exists to advance
the “development of confidential relationships that are socially desirable.” 15 Ultimately, the priest
in Phillips was able to ensure the return of the stolen property.16 The penitent did the right thing,
was taken back by the community and a socially desirable outcome was achieved. 17
The actual scope of the privilege varies from state to state.18 In Utah, for example, the
communication does not necessarily need to be penitential, but must be made in confidence for the
purpose of religious guidance.19 However, the clergy-penitent privilege is not a carte blanche
protection for all religious communications.20 It generally requires communications made directly

9

People v. Phillips, 1 Western L. J. 109 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813).
Nestle v. Commonwealth, 470 S.E.2d 133, 138 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
11
People v. Phillips, 1 Western L. J. 109 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813).
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 383 (3d Cir. 1990).
16
People v. Phillips, 1 Western L. J. 109 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813).
17
Id.
18
Cox v. Miller, 296 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 2002).
19
Scott v. Hammock, 870 P.2d 947, 956 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1994).
20
Varner v. Stovall, 500 F.3d 491, 495-98 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing specifically the Michigan codification of the
penitent privilege).
10
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to a member of the clergy.21 These statements must be made in confidence.22 This does not include
written communications.23 Additionally, the oral statements must be made for the purposes of
spiritual guidance. 24 In some instances the communications have been deemed privileged even
when made as nonpenitential communication. 25 In that example the court has insisted that the other
elements, confidential communication for spiritual guidance, be satisfied to consider the
communication as privileged. 26 The intricacies of the privilege differ from state to state.
One significant point of distinction is the possessor of the privilege. States differ on
whether the layperson or the clergyman holds the privilege. 27 This distinction sets the penitent
privilege apart from other privileges, in which typically the layperson alone possesses the
privilege.28 The purpose of the privilege does not differ from state to state.
The protection of the clergy privilege is only one of many competing public policy
concerns. Controversies, especially surrounding the Roman Catholic Church, have placed
increased pressure on mandatory reporting. 29 Under CAPTA, a greater emphasis has been placed
on assessing, screening, and investigating reports of child maltreatment.30 CAPTA requires each
state to have provisions in place requiring certain individuals to report this maltreatment. 31 Most

21

Id.
People v. Compobello, 810 N.E.2d 307, 321 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (ruling that statements made in front of a third
party will not be privileged unless that third party is vital to the act of confession).
23
Id. at 497 (holding that statements in a journal entry to God would not be protected).
24
Cox v. Miller, 296 F.3d 89, 110-11 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that statements made to members of Alcoholics
Anonymous were not protected because the statements in question were made to unburden and seek practical
guidance).
25
Scott v. Hammock, 870 P.2d 947, 954 (ruling that the “broad construction of the clergy-penitent privilege is
consistent with the purpose of its secular analogue.”).
26
Id. at 956.
27
Compare State v. J.G., 201 N.J. 369 (2010) (which states the privilege belongs to both the cleric and the penitent
and neither may waive it alone) with Nestle v. Commonwealth, 470 S.E.2d 133, 137 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (holding
that the privilege belongs to the clergyman and not the layperson).
28
Nestle v. Commonwealth, 470 S.E.2d 133, 137 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (discussing a comparison with other
privileges such as the physician-patient and the psychologist-client privileges).
29
Liam Stack, Colorado Report Accuses 43 Catholic Priests of Child Sex Abuse, N.Y. Times (Oct. 23, 2019)
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/23/us/colorado-catholic-church-abuse-investigation.html.
30
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 5106a.
31
Id.
22
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states have designated certain professions whose members are legally required to file reports of
child maltreatment. 32 Only approximately fifteen states list priest, rabbi, clergyman or another
religious leader as reporters of child maltreatment. 33 Clergy are mandatory reporters in other states
even though not specifically named. For instance, three states, Indiana, New Jersey and Wyoming
do not enumerate specific professionals instead requiring all persons to report child maltreatment. 34
Approximately eighteen states and Puerto Rico require anyone who suspects child maltreatment
to report such suspicions.35
Forty-seven states have addressed the issue of privilege in their reporting laws. 36 These
states have either affirmed the privileges or denied use of the privilege as justification for failing
to report.37 While the clergyman privilege has been widely affirmed, six states have denied it
exclusively in this context. 38 Some states, such as Washington, do not enumerate clergy as
mandatory reporters, but the penitent privilege is reaffirmed within the reporting laws. 39 Other
states do not address the issue, such as Hawaii and New York.40 The states must balance the interest
of reporting child maltreatment with the need to honor the First Amendment guarantees of the Free
Exercise Clause and Establishment Clauses.41

CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 5-68 (2019).
33
Id. at 3.
34
Id.
35
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 3 (2019).
36
Id. at 4 (excluding Connecticut, Mississippi, New Jersey and Puerto Rico).
37
Id.
38
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 4 (2019) (Six states and one territory, New Hampshire North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, Texas, West Virginia and Guam disallow the use of the penitent privilege as grounds for failure to report.).
39
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES. CLERGY AS MANDATORY
REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 2 (2019).
40
Id. at 6-20.
41
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (expressly incorporating the Free exercise clause of the First
Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (incorporating the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment).
32
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The need to report, as mandated by state statutes via CAPTA, has come in conflict with the
clergy privilege in recent years.42 In People v. Campobello, the Illinois Appellate Court had to
consider its state CAPTA reporting statute when a Roman Catholic priest was charged with an
alleged sexual assault of a young girl.43 The Catholic Diocese conducted an internal investigation,
but refused to turn over the results, arguing penitent privilege protection. 44 The Diocese argued
that communications between the Bishop and the priest in a professional capacity or as a spiritual
adviser was statutorily protected as privileged. 45
The Campobello court had previously determined that a clergyman’s professional capacity
was not broader than his or her role as a spiritual advisor.46 In People v. Bole, the minister testified
that he told the penitent defendant he was ineligible for counseling after he had previously lied to
the minister.47 The court held that the defendant’s admissions “were not obtained by the minister
in his professional character or as a spiritual adviser.”48 The Campobello court determined that the
pivotal phrase in the Illinois penitent privilege statute as “spiritual advisor in the course of the
discipline.”49 The Appellate Court concluded that the Diocese must produce all internal reports to
an in camera inspection to further evaluate the claim of privilege. 50
The current Illinois state statute on mandatory reporting explicitly affirms the clergyman
privilege, staying that “[a] member of the clergy may claim the privilege under §8-803 of the Code

42

Mayeux v. Charlet, 203 So.3d 1030 (La. 2016); People v. Campobello, 810 N.E 2d 307 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
People v. Campobello, 810 N.E. 2d 307 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
44
Id. at 311 (arguing that the report contained “religious thoughts and ideas of members of the Church”).
45
Campobello, 810 N.E.2d at 319.
46
Id. (citing People v. Bole, 585 N.E.2d 135, 147 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)).
47
People v. Bole, 585 N.E.2d 135, 147 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
48
Id.
49
Campobello, 810 N.E.2d at 320 (concluding that no “case or statute defines it”).
50
Id. at 322. (No subsequent procedural history exists to determine whether this communication was in fact
protected by the penitent privilege or not).
43
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of Civil Procedure.”51 It could be argued that the above communication, between members of the
clergy, would not be protected by the privilege as it was in writing, and the privilege does not
extend to written communications. If the communications were made orally between members of
clergy for the purpose of spiritual guidance in a matter of discipline, it may be protected from
discovery.52 However, the communications must be turned over to the court to determine what is
protected.53
Similar communications may continue to be classified as confidential under the penitent
privilege. Unfortunately, this is not the only instance of conflict between the privilege and
mandatory reporting statutes.
In Roman Catholic Diocese v. Morrison, the Roman Catholic Diocese claimed priestpenitent privilege in response to a child abuse scandal.54 The Court noted that while the Diocese
claims the privilege for most of its documents, it only applies to “communication [] made ‘to a
clergyman [or woman] in his [or her] professional character as spiritual adviser.” 55 The Court
concluded that several documents failed to qualify for this privilege because they “were clearly
not directed to anyone in their ‘professional character as spiritual adviser.’” 56 Similar to
Campobello, the Mississippi State Supreme Court requires a review of all documents claimed to
be confidential.57

CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CLERGY AS MANDATORY
REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 8 (2019) (quoting Comp. Stat. Ch. 325, §5/4).
52
See generally People v. Campobello, 810 N.E.2d at 318-22.
53
Id. at 322.
54
Roman Catholic Diocese v. Morrison, 905 So. 2d 1213, 1222-23, 1245-46 (2005) (the penitent privilege being one
of several privileges alleged by the Diocese).
55
Roman Catholic Diocese v. Morrison, 90 So. 2d at 1246 (quoting Miss. R. Evid. 505(b)).
56
Id. (quoting Miss. R. Evid. 505(b)).
57
Id. at 1248.
51
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The current Mississippi state CAPTA statute does not address the penitent privilege in its
mandatory reporting statute. 58 However, it does state that any minister with reasonable cause to
suspect maltreatment must orally report that suspicion immediately. 59
More recently, in Mayeux v. Charlet, Rebecca Mayeux was allegedly sexually assaulted
by long time parishioner and President of the Catholic funeral home. 60 The Mayeux family alleged
that the Catholic Diocese of Baton Rouge failed to report the sexual abuse.61 The family alleged
that a friar had knowledge of inappropriate sexual contact between the daughter and a church
official, but failed to report on it pursuant to the state’s mandatory reporting statute.62 The Diocese
moved to exclude any confessions made by Rebecca to the friar because any and all confessions
were made to the friar in his professional capacity and for spiritual guidance, entitling them to the
penitent privilege.63
The Louisiana State Supreme Court concluded that priests are not mandatory reporters
under either the former or current statute.64 The Court looked to the former reporting statute which
excludes members of clergy from reporting any confidential communication, especially when
there is a duty to keep such communications confidential. 65 The Court concluded that, because the
former statute had a carve out for clergymen, they were not mandatory reporters under the current
statute either.66 The current version of the Louisiana mandatory reporting statute states that:
[a] member of the clergy is not required to report a confidential communication . .
. from a person to a member of the clergy who in the course of the discipline or
practice of that church . . . is authorized to hear and is accustomed to hearing
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CLERGY AS MANDATORY
REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 11 (2019) (quoting Ann. Code § 43-21-353(1)).
59
Id. (quoting Ann. Code § 43-21-353(1)).
60
Mayeux v. Charlet, 203 So.3d 1030, 1032 (La. 2016).
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 1033.
64
Mayeux, 203 So.3d at 1038-40.
65
Id. at 1036 (citing La. Child. Code art. 603(15)).
66
Id. at 1038 (citing La. Child. Code art. 609).
58
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confidential communication and, under the discipline or tenets of that church . . .
has a duty to keep such communications confidential.67
This statute was changed in light of CAPTA requirements but continues to utilize much of
the language interpreted in Mayeux.68 In both Mayeux and Morrison, the reporting statute has been
usurped by the penitent privilege, which appear to protect the clergy. The Diocese in both cases
interpreted the penitent privilege to include communications between members of the clergy
because the communications were in the course of discipline.69 The friar was protected by the
privilege because he was a member of the clergy and communicated with administration for
disciplinary purposes.70 It is likely that the same outcome would be reached in a case today, as
little of the statutory language has changed.71
These three decisions walk the tight line of public interests. On one hand, the courts must
protect the public welfare and goals of the state CAPTA statutes, but on the other hand the states
must ensure the free exercise of religion and respect the penitent privilege. While the evidentiary
decisions of these cases may shock the public conscience, the information being excluded may not
impede all investigations or proceedings. The privilege is designed to encourage spiritual
communications and self-discipline through one’s religious institutions.72 The penitent privilege
is not intended to frustrate the criminal justice system, and it cannot prevent the discovery of nonprivileged information.73

CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CLERGY AS MANDATORY
REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 9 (2019) (quoting Children’s Code Art. 603(17)(b)-(c)).
68
Compare Children’s Code Art. 603(17)(b)-(c) with Mayeux, 203 So.3d at 1038 (quoting then active La. Child.
Code. art. 609).
69
See generally Mayeux v. Charlet, 203 So.3d 1030 (La. 2016); People v. Campobello, 810 N.E 2d 307 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2004).
70
Mayeux, 203 So.3d at 1038-40.
71
See generally Mayeux v. Charlet, 203 So.3d 1030 (La. 2016); People v. Campobello, 810 N.E 2d 307 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2004).
72
People v. Phillips, 1 Western L. J. 109 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813).
73
Id.
67
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The frustration surrounding the penitent privilege stem from the sex abuse scandals and
the clergy that have hid behind the privilege. 74 These cases differ from the original justification of
the penitent privilege. Under Phillips, the privilege exists to protect the penitent and their search
for spiritual absolution.75 However, the penitent privilege in modern cases is wielded more by
church administrators and priests than penitent laypeople. 76 The social good in these cases has
shifted from protecting the penitent practitioner of religion to exposing the misdeeds of religious
leaders who prey on vulnerable members of the community. The attempt to hide behind the
penitent privilege has shifted public perception of this protection. However, the penitent privilege
was not envisioned to protect the abuses committed by religious leaders. Despite these efforts, it
is still possible to discover the concealed evidence.
It is important to note that evidence protected by the penitent privilege, like any other
privilege, may still be admissible through another evidentiary avenue. The Supreme Court has held
that confidential or privileged communications are admissible when they are acquired from an
independent source, removed from the privileged conversation.77 Under the independent source
doctrine, statements by the penitent or statements that are not made in confidence are not protected
by the penitent privilege and are completely discoverable.
Clergy must report these unprotected statements in states that classify them as mandatory
reporters or mandatory reporters with reasonable suspicion of child mistreatment. Additionally,
witnesses to acts of child maltreatment may safely report instances of child maltreatment because

74

Liam Stack, Colorado Report Accuses 43 Catholic Priests of Child Sex Abuse, N.Y. Times (Oct. 23, 2019)
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/23/us/colorado-catholic-church-abuse-investigation.html.
75
People v. Phillips, 1 Western L. J. 109 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813).
76
Mayeux v. Charlet, 203 So.3d 1030 (La. 2016); People v. Campobello, 810 N.E. 2d 307, 318-22 (Ill. App. Ct.
2004).
77
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963).
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instances of abuse or neglect are not communications for the purpose of spiritual guidance and
would not be protected by the penitent privilege. 78
In addition to the independent source doctrine, the inevitable discovery exception has also
been applied.79 Either doctrine can be used to circumvent potential conflicts between penitent
privilege and CAPTA. It is important to reemphasize that in most cases the penitent is the one that
holds the privilege and may divulge the communications at their discretion.80 The few exceptions,
in which the clergyman holds the privilege entrust the power to the spiritual advisor to act in accord
with his or her conscience. 81 In those instances the privilege could not “be affected by the
communicant.”82 Based on this unique interpretation, it is unclear would may happen in the event
of the death of a clergyman who possesses the penitent privilege. If the holder of the penitent
privilege expresses intent to breach the privilege, that evidence may be discoverable, as well as the
method of discovery discussed above. The exclusionary nature of the penitent privilege does not
suppress all evidence and is not designed to. The privilege will only be used to exclude evidence
to vindicate or protect the holder of the privilege. 83
Despite the intricacies and differences, the penitent privilege functions like any other
privilege. It bars evidences that was intended to be kept in confidence, for the purpose of seeking
aid.84 The states’ CAPTA compliant statutes can do little to address the penitent privilege. Some
have denied the privilege in instances of child maltreatment, but it appears those instances have

78

See generally People v. Campobello, 810 N.E.2d at 318-22.
See People v. Burnidge, 687 N.E.2d 813, 816-17 (Ill. 1997) (holding that evidence which will inevitably be
discovered without error or misconduct may still be admitted) (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984)).
80
Compare State v. J.G., 201 N.J. 369 (2010) (which states the privilege belongs to both the cleric and the penitent
and neither may waive it alone) with Nestle v. Commonwealth, 470 S.E.2d 133, 137 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (holding
that the privilege belongs to the clergyman and not the layperson).
81
Nestle v. Commonwealth, 470 S.E.2d 133, 137 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Seidman v. Fishburne-Hudgins Educ.
Found., Inc., 724 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1984)).
82
Id. at fn. 3 (discussing the omission of penitent’s consent from this privilege alone).
83
People v. Burnidge, 687 N.E.2d 813, 818 (Ill. 1997).
84
Nestle v. Commonwealth, 470 S.E.2d 133, 137 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
79
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yet to be litigated in a significant capacity. It could be argued that limiting the penitent privilege
in any context may carry free exercise implications, as it inhibits a religious practice that is
fundamental to certain religious faiths.85
Section III – Free Exercise Clause Considerations
The penitent privilege supports the free exercise of religion, promoting spiritual guidance
and communication.86 Under the Free Exercise Clause, “Congress shall make no law . . .
prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].”87 This has been translated by the Supreme Court to
mean a mandated noninterference with religion. 88 Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence was
reinforced with the passing of RFRA which considers free exercise an “unalienable right” and
requires laws affecting free exercise to be the least restrictive means to advancing a compelling
government interest.89
It can be argued that the penitent privilege is necessary to the free exercise of religion in
this country. The court in Phillips called religious rites, such as the sacrament of confession,
essential to the free exercise of religion.90 The court ruled that the ability to participate in religious
rites is vital to the free exercise of religion.91 There is an emphasis on the veil of secrecy, which
the court finds vital to confession and the Catholic church as a whole. 92 The confidence is stated
to be of theological importance, not political. 93 If the privilege were unnecessarily constricted or

85

See People v. Phillips, 1 Western L. J. 109 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813).
People v. Phillips, 1 Western L. J. 109 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813).
87
U.S. CONST. Amend. I, § 1.
88
Walz v. Tax Com. Of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970).
89
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a).
90
People v. Phillips, 1 Western L. J. 109 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813).
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
86
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read too narrowly, it may inhibit the religious from seeking religious reconciliation. 94 The penitent
privilege depends on a sense of complete confidentiality. 95
It could be argued that the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA require the penitent privilege
to continue to exist in its current state. It may not be possible to curtail the privilege without
violating RFRA. Under RFRA, any substantial burden on the free exercise of religion must be
justified by a compelling governmental interest that does not have a possibly less restrictive
alternative.96
The burden on religious exercise would be substantial if the penitent privilege were
eliminated or narrowed. If certain statements or methods of communication with clergy were no
longer protected, the rite of confession and penance would be greatly inhibited. 97 The government
would have to put forth a compelling government interest. The Supreme Court established a strict
scrutiny standard of review because this is a “highly sensitive constitutional area.” 98
The government would have to show that it lacks other methods of achieving its goals
without burdening religion.99 Religious groups could argue that the privilege itself is the least
restrictive alternative: it is very narrow and does not interfere with mandatory duties when
confidential communications are not involved. This privilege, like all privileges has exceptions
and ways to circumvent the privilege. The penitent privilege exists to advance spiritual
communications and seek discipline through the exercise of religion. 100 It would be more
restrictive on the free exercise of religion to restrict how the penitent may converse with their

94

Scott v. Hammock, 870 P.2d 947, 954 (Utah 1994).
Id.
96
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963).
97
See generally Scott v. Hammock, 870 P.2d 947, 954 (Utah 1994); People v. Phillips, 1 Western L. J. 109 (N.Y.
Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813).
98
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1944).
99
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 728 (2014).
100
People v. Campobello, 810 N.E. 2d 307, 318-22 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
95
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clergy and seek religious absolution. Restrictions on the sacrament of confession would not
necessarily advance the interests set forth by the government. Holding priests in contempt for
failure to disclose penitent communications, for example, would not advance the interests of the
government, nor public policy in general.
The penitent privilege encourages the penitent to come forward and seek spiritual guidance
from their religious leaders and request absolution.101 The government could simply encourage the
clergy to encourage the penitent to come forward and confess these statements to the police. 102
This would preserve the free exercise of religion through the ceremony of confession as well as
encourage the reporting of allegations of child maltreatment by those seeking religious absolution.
As discussed above, information discovered outside of confidence is still discoverable and
serves the government’s compelling interest. Reports of child maltreatment can still come from
clergy and those that witness child maltreatment or hear conversations of child maltreatment
communicated outside of the context of confession or spiritual guidance. The clergy are still
required to report witnessed incidents of child maltreatment, for example. Therefore, it can be
argued that RFRA may require that the penitent privilege to persist because it is the less restrictive
alternative available that serves the government’s interest and promotes the free exercise of
religion.
A repeal of the Clergy Privilege may seem similar to the legislature’s action in Church of
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, in which the city council attempted to curtail free exercise
under the pretext of a generally applicable statute. 103 By repealing a religious privilege, religious

101

See generally People v. Campobello, 810 N.E. 2d 307, 318-22 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CLERGY AS MANDATORY
REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 9 (2019) (quoting Children’s Code Art. 603(17)(b)-(c) which states
that “clergy shall encourage that person to report the allegations to the appropriate authorities.”).
103
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
102
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organizations may argue that the government is attacking a religious practice through a supposed
general statute.104 It could be argued that since this privilege still exists for lawyers and therapists,
religion alone is being targeted. Without a compelling interest, such targeting is unconstitutional.
A Lukumi analysis would be necessary in states such as New Hampshire and West
Virginia, which under their respective CAPTA statutes, abrogated the clergy privilege. 105 The
West Virginia statute, for example, abrogated all privileged communications except for attorneyclient privilege in situations of known or suspected child maltreatment. 106 Additionally, the West
Virginia statute mandates that any member of the clergy with reasonable suspicion of child
maltreatment or whom has observed such maltreatment must immediately report the circumstances
within twenty-four hours of the suspicion.107
A clergyperson could bring a challenge under Lukumi, arguing that the generally
applicable law is unfairly targeting religion. This would be a relatively weak case however, as
most other privileges are abrogated as well as the penitent privilege. This situation is unlike
Lukumi, as there are not exceptions for the other privileges affected.108 The only similarity to
Lukumi in this instance is that not all privileges are abrogated, so the law is not generally applicable
or facially neutral. 109 In that case, strict scrutiny applies to the government’s action. 110 The state
could argue that there is not a significant burden on religion, as the facially neutral abrogation only
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impact statements involving evidence or suspicion of child maltreatment. The West Virginia
legislature could argue that there is a compelling government interest and that this is not a facially
neutral attempt to restrict religious practice.
There is an important public policy concern at issue when the state legislature mandates
the reporting of child maltreatment. The state intends to suspend husband-wife and professionalclient privileges to ensure that anyone with evidence or suspicion of child maltreatment may come
forward and that their evidence may be admissible in court. 111 The State may argue that attorneyclient privilege must be preserved to ensure the confidentiality in preparation for litigation.
The state has only abrogated privileges that may directly concern an instance or suspicion
of maltreatment that is not yet being litigated. The preservation of the attorney-client privilege is
to ensure the privacy and honesty in the realm of litigation, which would certainly be applicable
in child maltreatment cases. New Hampshire has taken similar language, only preserving the
attorney-client privilege.112 The statutes in both West Virginia and New Hampshire would most
likely survive a Lukumi challenge, as there does not appear to be any legislative intent to target
religion or provide exceptions to nonreligious privileges, except the attorney-client privilege.113 It
appears that the abrogation does not specifically burden religious exercise alone. The abrogation
affects medical privilege as well. The abrogation would be an issue if it only burdened conduct
motivated by religious belief. 114
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It may be argued that under the Free Exercise Clause the penitent privilege must persist in
order to permit the uninhibited practice of a religious rite. The penitent privilege has been deeply
rooted in American history as one of the oldest privileges and protections for religious practice.
The need for the government to refrain from interreference is guaranteed by Free Exercise Clause,
but the Free Exercise Clause often intersects with the issue of state accommodation under the
Establishment Clause. 115
Section IV – Establishment Clause Considerations
Challenges to the penitent privilege arise from Establishment Clause grounds. Under the
Establishment Clause, “Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion”. 116
Critics of the privilege may argue that this privilege is an unconstitutional endorsement of
religion.117 However, the privilege is only one of several privileges that holds communications in
confidence. It could be argued that the preservation of the penitent privilege is only another
permissible accommodation under the Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The triumvirate of
Walz v. Tax Com. Of New York, Lemon v. Kurtzman, and Corp. of Pres. Bishop v. Amos govern
this discussion.
The government cannot become extensively involved with religion. 118 The penitent
privilege, although protecting communications in a religious context, is not unlike other general
exceptions afforded to religion. In Walz v. Tax Com. Of New York, the Supreme Court held that
tax exemption status afforded to religious institutions did not violate the Establishment Clause
because many other organizations were exempt as well. 119 Like the tax exemption, the penitent
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privilege is not an exclusive benefit awarded to the church alone. Privileges exist for all manner
of communications with professionals, ranging from doctors and psychiatrists to attorneys and
therapists.120 The Supreme Court in Walz held that it was a permissible accommodation to grant
an exemption to religion when other exemptions were already granted. 121 The penitent privilege is
just one of many privileges, like the exemption granted in Walz.
Under Lemon v. Kurtzman, in order to satisfy the Establishment Clause, legislation must
be secular in purpose, must not advance nor inhibit religion, and it must not create entanglement
between the legislature and religion. 122 This is all done to ensure that the legislature does not
establish, sponsor or support religion. 123
An accommodation afforded for a religious institution or religious practice cannot delegate
civic or political authority to a group chosen “according to a religious criterion.” 124 The emphasis,
in the eyes of the Supreme Court, should be on the neutrality of the accommodation. 125 Legislators
must honor the neutrality between various religious institutions. 126
Additionally, in Corp. of Pres. Bishop v. Amos, the Supreme Court held that, to be
constitutional under the Establishment Clause, certain exemptions must promote free exercise.127
Justice Brennan, in his concurrence, elaborates, saying that certain exceptions can promote the
autonomy and free exercise of the church.128
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Courts would uphold the penitent privilege if they apply the jurisprudence discussed above.
The CAPTA statutes are narrowly tailored to protect only what is necessary, the confidential
communications of the clergy in a disciplinary, spiritual guidance context.
However, the Louisiana State Supreme Court has granted the penitent privilege, and the
clergy in general, a wider breadth of protections than other states. According to the Louisiana’s
Supreme Court, the penitent privilege exempts members of the clergy from any mandatory
reporting requirement.129 Members of the clergy in Louisiana are not mandatory reporters in any
context.130 This interpretation deviates from other states. A minority of states, Indiana, New Jersey,
and Wyoming, do not list specific occupations, but require that everyone is a mandatory reporter
when there is reasonable suspicion. 131 However, Louisiana’s State Supreme Court has interpreted
the omission of clergy from the mandatory reporting statute as an intentional exclusion from the
duty to report.132
The Louisiana Supreme Court gave a broad interpretation of a relatively narrow statute.
This could arguably be an impermissible accommodation, as it gives greater latitude to religion.
Other professionals, such as health practitioners, mental health practitioners or social workers are
still mandatory reporters. 133 The Louisiana statute on privileged communications explicitly deals
with the penitent privilege separately, addressing it in detail before covering other professional
privileges.134 The statute states that mental health or social service practitioners are excluded from
the mandatory reporter law when professional legal representation is involved. 135 This restriction
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on secular privilege is more narrow than the ruling of the Louisiana Supreme Court which
interpreted the legislative intent to exclude clergy from the list of mandatory reporters
altogether.136
The interpretation of the Louisiana statute, and the statutes that do not list clergy as
mandatory reporters, may run afoul of the Establishment Clause. It could be argued that these
statutes are an impermissible accommodation of religion, incongruous with the Establishment
Clause. The statutes on their face would satisfy the first prong of Lemon because they are secular
in purpose.137 The secular purpose is to require the reporting of actual or suspected child
maltreatment from those who have witnessed or have reasonable suspicion of such conduct. 138 The
statues pertaining to the statute of clergy may be at issue with the second prong of the Lemon test.
In addition to the secular purpose, the legislation must not advance or inhibit religion and
must not lead to government entanglement. 139 It may be argued that the statutes that do not
explicitly or implicitly mandate reporting are unfairly biased towards religion. In states such as
Alaska and Washington, members of the clergy are not covered by an explicit section of the
reporting law and not covered by an “any person” provision.140 Instead, clergy in Washington are
provided statutory immunity from liability if they elect to report. 141 This is to protect the clergy
from the fear of the penitent raising breach of fiduciary duty claims against them. The Washington
statute may unfairly favor religion, as many professions are required to report. 142 While this statute
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does excuse all reporters from divulging privileged communications, it still requires secular
reporters to remain vigilant while members of the clergy are now exempt.143 The statute also
provides protection for those with confidential communication who come forward, such as
“clergy-penitent and physician-patient privilege.”144 This is the only explicit mention of clergy,
however.145
By requiring fewer requirements on sectarian professions than secular professions, it could
be argued that the Washington statute violates the Establishment Clause. The duty to report is a
legal requirement set forth in statute that requires professionals to take an active role in reporting
child maltreatment. If the clergy are not required to participate in this program, it protects them
from the possibility of violating the statue.
It could be argued that these statutes do not involve entanglement between the government
and religious institutions. The involvement with religious institutions is minimal. In the statutes
that require it, the clergy must report instances or suspicion of child maltreatment, as with other
secular professions. 146 These statutes do not regulate religious practices or the grant the religious
institutions any legislative power. 147
The penitent privilege would be an impermissible accommodation in the lens of the
Establishment Clause if religious institutions alone had the power to take statements in confidence,
excluding them from admissible discovery on their own terms. 148 When an exemption lacks
sufficient breadth or is exclusive to religion, it will fail the Establishment Clause because it
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impermissibly favors religion. 149 The Supreme Court has emphasized that breadth matters when
holding that a particular exclusion does not promote a religion or religious practices over secular
ones.150 It can be argued that the standard of privileged communications, held in confidence is
substantially broad as it is one privilege among many and is the only privilege to incorporate
religious practices.151
While it is argued that the privilege does not discriminate against denominations, the act
of secret communication is not universally shared between all religions.152 Some cases reference
the roots of confession and the Catholic church specifically in discussing the history of the
privilege.153 It can be argued that this causes the privilege to fail the Establishment Clause because
one religion cannot be officially preferred over another.154 This discrepancy may raise concerns
about favoritism and the endorsement of specific religions. Such preference would run against the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
However, the privilege exists for any religious group that utilizes secretive, repentant
dialogue with a spiritual guide for the purposes of spiritual guidance. 155 The privilege does not
explicitly name a sect or denomination protected by this privilege. Therefore, it can be argued that
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the privilege’s existence does not favor one religion over another, so long as no group is explicitly
included or excluded from the benefit of the privilege.
It could be argued that these statutes only protect those religions that utilize the penitent
privilege and therefore advance some religions over others. Religions that do not incorporate
private confession into their practices, such as Islam, may argue that their penitent practices are
not protected from mandatory reporting laws. Muslims generally do not communicate their sins to
anyone but Allah. 156 Practicing Muslims may argue that the penitent privilege establishes a
preference for Christianity.
It may be argued that there is implicit bias in the penitent privilege. The penitent privilege
in New Jersey, for example, protects confidential communications to a cleric in their “professional
character” or to a spiritual advisor for disciplinary purposes or as a religious practice. 157 If a
Muslim practitioner shares his or her penance with another member of their Mosque, it may not
be protected because it may not be a religious practice of the church.
Additionally, members of the Church of the Latter-Day Saints would not be protected by
this statute either, as confessing to another member of the congregation would not be to a cleric or
spiritual advisor, despite being a religious practice for the purposes of spiritual guidance and
discipline. These two faiths are only two examples of those that do not utilize the penitent privilege.
Despite these arguments, it may be best from an Establishment Clause standpoint to leave the
penitent privilege as it is.
The Establishment Clause prevents the explicit endorsement or inhibition of a religion. 158
However, the penitent privilege is still a permissible accommodation for religion. The penitent
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privilege serves to protect all confidential communications in order to encourage the pursuit of
spiritual guidance.159 The penitent privilege exists to provide confidentiality to those religions that
utilize a confidential rite of confession. It does not explicitly list or favor one religion over another.
It does not actively exclude any specific religion from utilizing the privilege.
Those religions that do not utilizing confession naturally cannot benefit from the privileges
surrounding confession. It would violate the Establishment Clause if the government created
individual immunities for all religions, including those not covered by the penitent privilege. Under
the Lemon test, legislation cannot create government entanglement with religion. 160 It would be
excessive government entanglement for legislators to create privileges and protections for every
specific religion to protect communications. This could arguably lead the government to regulate
and protect certain religious practices to ensure equal protection of various religious groups. This
line of accommodations would create a slippery slope as various religious communication
protections would need to be evaluated to make sure that the statutes do not favor or inhibit
religion. This would lead to impermissible accommodations.
It is safer for the states to maintain the penitent privilege, as it is the best option to maintain
a facially neutral accommodation. Those religions that choose to incorporate an act of confession
held in confidence can benefit from the act, while other religions handle their rites of penance
differently. The penitent privilege is wide enough and sufficiently neutral to accommodate all
religions. It protects religious, confidential communications with a spiritual leader, in their
professional or spiritual capacity, in order to obtain guidance.161 These factors, similar to the
language in other state statutes, allow the religions to determine if the privilege protects them in
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their practices. This ensures that the government respects the free exercise of religion and does not
endorse one religion over another.
The penitent privilege generally does not run afoul of the Establishment Clause. The issues
arise when evaluating the state compliant CAPTA statutes. The statutes handle the penitent
privilege differently depending on the positions of each state. States such as Louisiana and
Washington are arguably overbroad in the leeway granted clergy. When the states do not qualify
the clergy are mandatory reporters, it can be argued that the states are endorsing religion.
The CAPTA statutes may fail the Lemon test if they advance or inhibit certain religions or
show excessive entanglement depending on how they handle the role of clergy in their reporting
statutes. The privilege does not favor certain religions just because certain religions do not practice
the act of confession. It would create greater Establishment Clause issues if independent caveats
for religions that do not actively incorporate the rite of confidential confession into their religious
practices. It would create greater challenges for religious groups and legislators if the penitent
privilege were repealed or abrogated on Establishment Clause grounds.
Section V – Conclusion
The penitent privilege is one of the oldest privileges afforded to confidential
communications. The privilege protects the communications of the clergyman and the penitent to
further the free exercise of religion and encourage the religious sacrament of confession. While
each state has drafted the privilege slightly differently, the privilege generally requires a
confidential communication with a professional in their capacity as a spiritual leader for the
purposes of spiritual guidance. This privilege is typically possessed by the penitent, though some
states have vested the penitent privilege with the clergyman.
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The penitent privilege comes into conflict with state compliant CAPTA statutes. The
interest of protecting spiritual guidance is forced to compete with the state interest of preventing
child maltreatment. However, many states have affirmed the penitent privilege within their
CAPTA statutes. Only a handful of states have denied the use of the penitent privilege as grounds
for refusing to report child maltreatment. In three cases, state courts have held that internal
communications were protected by the penitent privilege because clergyman were communicating
with church administration in a disciplinary context while in their professional capacity as spiritual
advisors. The outcomes of these cases would not change when applying the respective states’
current child reporting statutes.
The penitent privilege is closely protected by RFRA which ensures the free exercise of
religion by reinstating the compelling interest test for free exercise claims. RFRA safeguards the
free exercise of religion by requiring facially neutral statutes that affect religion to advance a
compelling state interest without a less restrictive alternative. It may be argued that it is a less
restrictive alternative to simply allow the penitent privilege to persist. The removal of the penitent
privilege would inhibit the religious sacrament of confession.
The penitent privilege itself does not violate on the Establishment Clause. This is only one
of many privileges protecting secretive communications, held in confidence. It is a permissible
accommodation to permit the penitent privilege in addition to the other professional privileges.
The Establishment Clause issues arise when the penitent privilege is applied to the state compliant
CAPTA statutes. Different states handle the clergyman privilege differently in their reporting
statutes. The ones that exclude the clergy from their language arguably violate the Establishment
Clause by favoring religion. It may be argued that the penitent privilege itself favors certain
religions over others, but it can also be argued that this supposed favoritism is the choice of the
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religious institutions rather than the government. Overall, the penitent privilege should survive
Establishment Clause challenges.
The penitent privilege’s only differentiating factor from other state-recognized privileges
is the involvement of religious institutions. The penitent privilege has a long running history in
this country and has been vital to the free exercise of religious rites and practices. Some wish to
curtail this specific privilege considering controversies in the Catholic Church and the rise of
mandatory reporting statutes. However, privilege satisfies both the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause, and the clergy are still required to report information that is not obtained
through the act of confession.

27

Bibliography
U.S. CONST. Amend. I, § 1.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb
42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(1)(A)-(b)(2)(B)(i).
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. V. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, 137 S.Ct. 2012 (2017).
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012).
Bd. Of Educ. V. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 698 (1994).
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S.
327 (1987).
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984)
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Walz v. Tax Com. of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
Varner v. Stovall, 500 F.3d 491 (6th Cir. 2007).
Cox v. Miller, 296 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2002).
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1990).
Mayeux v. Charlet, 203 So. 3d 1030 (La. 2016).
Lightman v. Flaum, 761 N.E.2d 1027, 1030-31 (NY 2001).

28

People v. Burnidge, 178 Ill. 2d 429, 436-37 (Ill. 1997).
Scott v. Hammock, 870 P.2d 947 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1994).
People v. Campobello, 810 N.E 2d 307 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)
Nussbaumer v. State, 882 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
Nestle v. Commonwealth, 470 S.E.2d 133 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
People v. Bole, 585 N.E.2d 135, 147 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
People v. Phillips, 1 Western L. J. 109 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813).
Amicus Curiae Brief of Catholic Action for Faith and Family et. al. in Support of Petitioners on
Petition For A Writ of Certiorari, Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Baton Rouge
v. Mayeux, 135 S. Ct. 1154 (2015).
Quran 3:16
Romney, Marion G., President, Repentance. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
(10/05/1980).
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT

OF

HEALTH

AND

HUMAN SERVICES. CLERGY AS

MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (2019).
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT

OF

HEALTH

AND

HUMAN SERVICES. MANDATORY

REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (2019).
Liam Stack, Colorado Report Accuses 43 Catholic Priests of Child Sex Abuse, N.Y. Times (Oct.
23,

2019)

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/23/us/colorado-catholic-church-abuse-

investigation.html.
Caroline Donze, Breaking the Seal of Confession: Examining the Constitutionality of the ClergyPenitent Privilege in Mandatory Reporting Law, 78 La. L Rev. 1. (2018).
Christine P. Bartholomew, Exorcising the Clergy Privilege, 103 Va. L. Rev. 1015 (2017).

29

Paul Winters, Whom Must the Clergy Protect: The Interests of at-Risk Children in Conflict with
Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 62 DePaul L. Rev. 187 (2012).

30

